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An Application of Risk Analysis
to the Doctrine of Self-Defense
Kirsten Welch
Abstract
Although it is an unavoidable aspect of any self-defense situation, risk is an
underdeveloped concept in the self-defense literature. In this paper, I argue that the
existence of objective risk can justify the use of self-defense, even in cases in which
defensive action is not clearly necessary. To accomplish this, I first introduce the
concept of risk, seeking a definition that incorporates both objective and subjective
elements in a manner appropriate to a discussion of self-defense. In section two, I
make a case for the appropriate way to carry out and apply risk analysis in selfdefense situations, addressing questions of perspective, types of threats, and
availability of alternatives to the use of defense of force. Based on this discussion,
I will suggest that it is unjust to require a person to take on extra risk when that risk
can be transferred to the person responsible for the creation of the risk. In section
three, I discuss some significant implications the consideration of risk as suggested
by my analysis has for current approaches to self-defense doctrine. Most
importantly, my analysis indicates that self-defense can be justified even if using
violent force against an aggressor is not strictly necessary.
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Consider the following two scenarios:
Case 1: Dr. Maleficus, an evil scientist, has forced Bill into a game of Russian
roulette. Dr. Maleficus, being the brilliant scientist that he is, has created a gun
that is bigger on the inside and has a thousand chambers, only one of which actually
contains a bullet. Dr. Maleficus is about to pull the trigger. May Bill kill him in
self-defense? 1
Case 2: Westley has been captured by the Dread Pirate Roberts, who has the
reputation of killing all his hostages without mercy. The Dread Pirate Roberts,
however, being in an amiable frame of mind, has decided to let Westley live one
more night. Before retiring, he says, “Good night, Westley. Sleep tight. I’ll most
likely kill you in the morning.” During the night, Westley discovers that his door
is unlocked and that the Dread Pirate Roberts carelessly left his sword lying on the
deck. May Westley kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense? 2
Does Bill or Westley have a higher chance of dying if he does not choose to act in
self-defense? We do not have an exact numerical probability by which to estimate the
chances that the Dread Pirate Roberts will kill Westley in the morning, but it is probably
safe to assume that the probability is higher—indeed, significantly higher—than the one in
one thousand chance of dying that Bill faces. Arguably, then, if Bill should be able to act
in self-defense in Case 1, Westley should be able to act in self-defense in Case 2, given his
chance of dying is much greater than Bill’s. The problem, though, is that current selfdefense doctrine as employed in many jurisdictions demands a different evaluation:
according to the rule of self-defense, Bill may kill Dr. Maleficus, but Westley may not kill
the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense.
In this paper, I will make the case for the claim that Westley should be able to
employ self-defense against the Dread Pirate Roberts. In doing so, I will focus my
discussion on a concept that has so far been underdeveloped in the self-defense literature:
the concept of risk. I will argue that the existence of objective risk can justify the use of
self-defense, even in cases in which the possibility of death or serious injury is not
imminent and situations in which defensive action is not clearly necessary. To accomplish
1

Russian roulette cases crop up frequently in the self-defense literature. For an example of how a
Russian roulette case can contribute to constructing a theory of self-defense, see Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” Law and Philosophy 24 (2005): 711-749.
2
This case, in its essential features, is a slightly more theatrical version of Paul Robinson’s hostage
scenario. See Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses 2 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1984): 77.
Note that one way to accommodate the intuition that the hostage character should be able to act in
self-defense in these sorts of cases is to claim that self-defense is being employed not directly against
the threat of future death but rather against the ongoing harm resulting from loss of freedom and
violation of rights. For this sort of response, see Onder Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to
Self-Defense: Is the Requirement of Imminence Merely a Translator for the Concept of Necessity?”
Journal of Criminal Law 72 (2008): 161. Whether or not Bakircioglu is correct in his analysis, for
the purposes of this paper I believe we can safely disregard this objection, as some real-life cases I
will examine later on will make it clear this sort of analysis does not always solve the problem.
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this, I will first introduce the concept of risk, highlighting the epistemic difficulties inherent
in self-defense situations. In section two, I will make a case for the appropriate way to
carry out and apply risk analysis in self-defense situations, suggesting a person should not
be required to take on extra unjust risk when that risk can be transferred to the person
culpable for the creation of the risk. In section three, I will discuss some significant
implications the consideration of risk as suggested by my analysis has for current
approaches to self-defense doctrine.
1. What is Risk?
Risk is most simply understood as a probability of harm. 3 When we engage in
risky behavior, we understand we are creating the chance that a certain negative outcome
will materialize as a result of our conduct.4 Thus, in order to understand risk, we need to
grasp its two main constituent concepts: probability and harm. 5 For the purposes of this
project, we can treat harm as a fairly straightforward idea: anything that serves to provide
a setback to a person’s interests can count as a harm. 6 Probability is quite a bit more
complicated. We need to distinguish between two different types of probability, and hence
two different approaches to the notion of risk.
Probability can be objective or epistemic. A common way of describing objective
probability is the use of relative frequencies. On this view, the probability that an event
will occur is determined by the rate at which the event occurs in similar situations. 7 This
frequency is simply an objective fact about the world, independent of whether anybody can
come to know that fact. On the other hand, epistemic conceptions of probability appeal to
at least some degree of subjectivity when making probability assessments. Epistemic
conceptions of probability fall on an objective/subjective spectrum, and the view of
epistemic probability with which we will be concerned for this project combines objective
and subjective elements. This view is what Stephen Perry calls the “reasonableness
account” of epistemic probability, and he claims this account is grounded in two
fundamental assumptions: first, relative frequencies as hypothesized by the purely
3

John Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,” Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 369.
Stephen R. Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law,
ed. David Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 322.
5
Id.
6
This definition comes from Stephen Perry, id. Interestingly, on this definition, it seems that risk
itself could be a harm, as being forced to live with risk could be a setback to a person’s interests on
many levels. Some scholars have made arguments that risk itself is a harm along these lines: for
an argument based on the negative value of risk, see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” in
The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed. Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016): 134-135; for an argument grounded in the concept of autonomy, see Oberdiek,
“Towards a Right Against Risking,” 367-392; for an argument centered on the claim that risk makes
a person worse-off than he would have been otherwise, see Claire Finkelstein, “Is Risk a Harm?”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151 (2003): 963-1001. If risk itself is a harm, this assertion
might further support the claim that the existence of risk can legitimize the use of self-defense. This
is a controversial stance, however, and so I will not make use of it in my own argument.
7
Perry, “Risk, Harm, and Responsibility,” 323.
4
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objective account really do exist; second, people are capable of estimating those
frequencies. 8 Thus, the reasonableness account of epistemic probability incorporates the
objectivity of relative frequencies and a subjective assessment supported by those relative
frequencies.
When applying these two conceptions of probability to the concept of risk, it
becomes clear that we can approach our analysis of risk in two different ways. If we make
use of the purely objective account of probability, then risk is a relative frequency
calculated by the function of the number of times the risk is manifested in actual harm
divided by the total number of relevantly similar situations. An epistemic conception of
probability, on the other hand, will yield a conception of risk in which risk is a subjective
estimation of the chance the harm threatened by the risk will come to fruition. Using a
purely subjective epistemic account, risk is nothing more than what the person at risk
believes it to be, but the reasonableness account of epistemic risk leads to a subjective but
evidence-driven estimation of the relative frequencies posited by the objective view.
For the purposes of this project, we will be concerned with the reasonableness
account of epistemic risk. Both the purely subjective epistemic version and the purely
objective version include pitfalls that significantly undermine the concerns of the selfdefense doctrine under consideration. When working with a purely subjective conception
of risk, the chance the harm will materialize is divorced from reality. On the other hand, it
seems questionable that we could ever achieve a useful assessment of risk that is purely
objective—indeed, the very process of a person assessing the probability that a harm will
materialize necessitates the inclusion of a subjective element. 9
2. Assessing Risk for Self-Defense
Now that we have a grasp of the main features of risk, we can apply this concept
to the theory of self-defense. An essential feature of self-defense situations is that, given
our epistemic limitations, these situations always involve a certain degree of uncertainty,
some more so than others. 10 We can never be sure whether self-defense is truly necessary
or not. 11 As a result, every case of self-defense demands an evaluation of risk. Given this,
8

Id. at 325.
Claire Finkelstein argues we do not ever have access to truly objective probabilities: “[T]here is
no such thing as an objective probability. There are only degrees of belief or confidence about the
likelihood of a certain event occurring … Thus although an agent’s degree of belief will be based
on real observations he can make, likelihoods cannot be a matter of objective facts.” Finkelstein,
“Is Risk a Harm?” 973. Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan support a similar view.
claiming that “objective probabilities are illusory.” See Alexander and Ferzan, Crime and
Culpability: A Theory of Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009): 31.
10
As Larry Alexander observes with respect to self-defense, “Only God can see the future with
absolute certainty.” Larry Alexander, “A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection.” Notre
Dame Law Review 74 (1999): 1478. Because we cannot see the future, self-defense is always
preemptive, and as a result, uncertainty will always be present to some degree. See Bergelson,
“Self-Defense and Risks,” 132.
11
This surety goes for the defender at the moment of self-defense as well as for the court after selfdefense has taken place. In fact, the only situations in which it seems we can be sure that self9

17

it might seem surprising that risk has received relatively little attention within the context
of self-defense. 12
In section one, I explained the conception of risk this project will be utilizing. This
explanation gives us a structure with which to proceed, but it does not tell us how we ought
to go about assessing the level of risk present in a scenario on a practical level or how that
risk should be employed when thinking about situations of self-defense. 13 From what
perspective should we assess risk? What sort of threats should we take into account when
estimating the level of risk? To what degree should we take into consideration alternatives
that might allow the potential victim to dispel the risk? I will address each of these three
questions in turn.
2.1 Perspective
I endorsed the “reasonableness” account of epistemic risk for two reasons: first,
because it maintains a tie to objectivity in that it attempts to estimate accurately the
important relative frequencies; second, because it recognizes the fact that whenever a
person carries out a risk evaluation, that evaluation will be conducted from a certain
perspective. The question at hand, then, is what perspective is the appropriate one to
consider in self-defense scenarios. I want to evaluate three possible answers to this
question, rejecting two and tentatively accepting the other. I will not consider the
perspective of the aggressor, because considering this perspective ceases to assign meaning
to the concept of risk in the first place: since the aggressor is in control of the situation,
from his perspective the risk to the victim will essentially be either 100% or 0%, depending
on whether or not he truly intends to kill. 14
First, consider the perspective of the defender. In most situations, it seems that the
defender will form a belief that he is at risk based on the presence of certain behaviors or
threats manifested on the part of the aggressor. In other words, the defender’s belief that
he is at risk will not come out of thin air. But is this belief enough? Even if the defender
forms his belief based on evidence that he is at risk, it seems that in many situations, such
a belief will also be influenced—in fact, perhaps influenced even more greatly—by
subjective factors such as fear or hate.15 Human beings are emotional creatures, and as

defense was necessary are situations in which the potential defender chose not to use self-defense
and was afterwards killed by the aggressor.
12
Bergelson observes that “the current law of self-defense seems to ignore the degree of risk that
the target of an offense may be actually hurt.” Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 141.
13
Ferzan addresses this question, concluding the perspective of the defender is the only appropriate
starting point from which to assess the risk present in a self-defense situation. See Ferzan,
“Justifying Self-Defense,” 739-748.
14
I suppose it could be argued that the aggressor cannot know if he is about to suffer a fatal heart
attack in the five seconds before he intends to pull the trigger, but I think that we can safely ignore
this sort of objection here.
15
People who have been under a great deal of stress or have dealt with abuse for a significant amount
of time might be especially likely to estimate risk based on their subjective fears rather than objective
evidence. For a discussion of how chronic pressure can affect people’s judgment, see Richard
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such, we are radically subject to distorted perceptions of reality. A potential defender will
probably be able to discern that he is facing some sort of threat, but he might not be able
to evaluate accurately the nature and degree of the riskiness in his situation. For this reason,
I believe that making the defender’s perspective the only one we take into consideration
when evaluating risk is implausible.16
Next, consider the perspective of a “reasonable” defender. The “reasonable
person” standard is incredibly muddled, and it seems no one really knows what it is
supposed to mean. 17 For this project, though, consider the following scenario and the
meaning of ‘reasonable’ it entails:
Vulcan Bob has been incarcerated in a human prison for obnoxious theorizing. As
is typical of a Vulcan, Vulcan Bob is extremely rational: his emotions do not lead
him astray in his decision-making processes, and he is capable of accurately
evaluating the probable outcomes of many situations. Unfortunately, Vulcan Bob
has been placed in a cell with another prisoner, Evil Joe, who has a reputation for
sexually abusing his cellmates – especially those with strangely shaped ears.
Within the first day in the cell, Evil Joe begins to threaten to rape Vulcan Bob in
the middle of the night. Vulcan Bob evaluates the risk he faces and calculates that
there is (roughly) a 90% chance that Evil Joe will actually attempt to rape him
within the next week.
In this scenario, Vulcan Bob is still assessing the risk from a subjective perspective; that
is, he is assessing it based on the access he has to the evidence that he is indeed at risk.
However, Vulcan Bob is assessing risk purely based on the objective data about this
particular situation. 18
The sort of risk assessment in which Vulcan Bob engages would probably be an
excellent standard by which to evaluate risk. It is objective in that it is concerned with the
available evidence, and it is subjective in that it is still conducted from a limited epistemic
Lippke, “Chronic Temptation, Reasonable Firmness, and the Criminal Law,” Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 34, no. 1 (2014): 75-96.
16
Ferzan accepts the perspective of the defender as the proper perspective for assessing risk.
However, she does so only after establishing that what she calls “objective triggering conditions”
exist in the particular situation. On her view, once objective triggering conditions have been
established, any possibility of risk is enough to merit self-defense on the part of the potential victim;
as a result, it does not significantly matter whether or not the victim’s perceptions are being distorted
by emotional factors. My project is slightly different, in that I want to determine the correct
perspective from which to decide whether the triggering conditions in fact create risk. For Ferzan’s
discussion of triggering conditions, see Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 733-738.
17
For a brief overview of some of the approaches to the “reasonable person” and a discussion of the
problems associated with the vagueness of the standard, see Andrew Ingram, “Parsing the
Reasonable Person: The Case of Self-Defense,” American Journal of Criminal Law 39 (2012):
430-433.
18
For an argument in support of this sort of approach, see Michael J. Zimmerman, Living with
Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008): ix-xi, 97-117. Vera Bergelson rejects this approach for practical reasons similar to mine:
see Vera Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risks,” 137.
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perspective. I believe, however, that this approach to risk assessment is also implausible,
mainly because it is, arguably, impossible. No one, whether the defender or a third party,
will be able to assess truly impartially the risk associated with an isolated situation.
Vulcans, in real life, do not exist.
Finally, I want to consider the third-party perspective. Vera Bergelson argues for
the use of what she calls a “contemporaneous objective standard” when evaluating the
degree of risk present in a situation. 19 The key question for this approach is this: “What is
the likelihood that, in the ordinary course of things, this risk will materialize?” 20 This
approach combines both objective and subjective elements in a way that seems to fit well
with the purpose of the self-defense doctrine. On the one hand, it accounts for the limited
epistemic perspective of the person assessing the risk, as such a person must try to answer
the key question based on whatever evidence he has about the situation, and similar
situations, at that time. It also recognizes the difficulty of precisely assessing the degree
of risk when human agents are involved. 21 On the other hand, it makes use of the concept
of relative frequency by use of the notion of “the ordinary course of things.” 22 Despite our
limited epistemic perspective, we can still access statistical information that will help us
estimate the likelihood that a risk will come to fruition.23
There is an objection to this approach that is worth considering. The
contemporaneous objective standard demands that we compare the current situation with
other similar scenarios. The problematic question is as follows: what counts as the set of
similar scenarios? This question is a generality problem, a problem of reference class. It
seems we could infinitely redraw the relevant reference class by specifying different levels
19

Bergelson, “Self-Defense and Risk,” 137.
Id. Note also that either the defender or the trier of fact could ask this question, but doing so
would involve a detached, third party perspective in either case.
21
This is the case even in instances of Russian roulette, when we can calculate some portion of the
probability with complete precision. If we know how many chambers the gun has and how many
bullets are in the chambers, then we can calculate the exact probability that the victim will be killed
if the gun is fired. But it does not tell us anything about the probability that the gun will, in fact, be
fired: “To be clear, this approach does not allow for the precise calculation, mainly because of the
difficulty in predicting the choice of a free moral agent, particularly the choice to act wrongfully;
however, it gives us at least a general sense of high and low probability and it does so from the
objective perspective required by the justificatory nature of self-defense.” Id. at 137-138.
22
The phrase, “in the ordinary course of things,” is, admittedly, a bit vague. A comment in Roy v.
U.S. clarifies what Bergelson means by this phrase in the context of the contemporaneous objective
standard: “The phrase “in the ordinary course of things” refers to what may reasonably ensue from
the planned events, not to what might conceivably happen, and in particular suggests the absence of
intervening factors.” Roy v. U.S., 652 A. 2d 1098, 1105 (D.C. Ct. App. 1995).
23
Christopher Schroeder suggests that statistical evaluation, when applied to a large enough sample,
can give us an excellent estimate of the chance that risky behavior will result in harm: “Once the
probability of harm associated with a risky action can be gauged, an axiom of statistical theory holds
that a sufficient number of repetitions of that action practically guarantees that the harm actually
will occur.” See Christopher Schroeder, “Rights against Risks,” Columbia Law Review 86 (1986):
500. Given the difficulty of predicting the behavior of human agents, this claim might be overly
optimistic, but it seems that statistical information certainty can help us make accurate estimations
of risk.
20
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of generality for the similarity requirement. 24 To illustrate this problem, at this point it
will be helpful to introduce a few real-life cases that will continue to form a basis for this
discussion. These cases are all concerned with threats of death or serious bodily harm in
prison contexts. 25
State v. Schroeder: Schroeder shared a cell with Riggs, who had a reputation for
violence and forcing sex upon fellow inmates. For a while, Riggs had been
coercing Schroeder into gambling with him, and, as a result, Schroeder owed Riggs
a large debt, which Riggs had been threatening to collect in the form of homosexual
favors. On the night in question, before going to sleep, Riggs said that he might
“collect some of this money I got owed me tonight.” While Riggs was asleep,
Schroeder stabbed him in the back with a table knife. 26
U.S. v. Haynes: Haynes, an inmate at a federal prison, was convicted of assault
after he poured scalding oil on the head of a fellow inmate, Nelson Flores-Pedroso,
while Flores-Pedroso was sitting in the prison cafeteria. Flores-Pedroso had a
reputation for coercing weaker inmates, and for about a month prior to this assault,
Flores-Pedroso had been threatening Haynes with forced homosexual acts if
Haynes did not use his position as a member of the food preparation staff in the
kitchen to do favors for Flores-Pedroso. 27
U.S. v. Bello: Bello, an inmate who was working in the food line at the prison
cafeteria, denied second helpings to the victim Santana-Rosa as not all the
prisoners had been served yet. Santana told Bello that he was going to “crack open
[Bello’s] head,” and after the meal was over another inmate came up and told Bello
24

John Oberdiek observes that if we can infinitely redraw the reference class and have no guidelines
as to how to specify the correct reference class, an objective account of probability becomes every
bit as indeterminate as a subjective account. See Oberdiek, “Towards a Right Against Risking,”
368.
25
It is worth noting that the question of whether prison inmates should be able to plead self-defense
at all has been answered in different ways. A negative answer to the question might be motivated
by the intuition that, as prison inmates are responsible for ending up in prison in the first place, they
are indirectly responsible for the threat that motivates acting in self-defense. As a result, they should
not be able to plead self-defense at all. For example, in Rowe v. Debruyn, Rowe was denied selfdefense as a complete defense by prison officials at a disciplinary hearing after having been involved
in a brawl with another inmate, Michael Evans. Evans, who occupied the cell next to Rowe, made
sexual demands upon Rowe, and the morning after making these demands, Evans entered Rowe’s
cell and attempted to rape him. Rowe responded by striking Evans on the head with a pot. The
circuit court held that the prison officials did not violate Rowe’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment by not allowing him to plead self-defense as a complete defense. See Rowe
v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994). For an argument in support of the right of prison inmates
to employ self-defense in general, see Anders Kaye, “Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense
in Prison and Prison Conditions Jurisprudence,” University of Chicago Law Review 63, no. 2 (1996):
693-726.
26
State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822 (1978).
27
U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089 (7th Cir. 1998).
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that Santana planned to assault him in the recreational yard later on. Later, during
the recreational period, Bello attacked Santana, who was playing dominoes, with
a broom handle and gave him a serious concussion. 28
These cases have many similarities: all involve verbal threats, all involve a fellow inmate
with whom the potential victim had some prior contact, etc. But significant differences
exist as well. Schroeder and Riggs were cellmates. In Bello, the threat was reiterated
through another individual, which was not the case in Schroeder or Haynes. Schroeder
and Haynes both faced repeated threats, whereas Bello’s situation seemed to be a one-time
occurrence. So, what should the criteria be for determining the relevant reference classes
for these situations?
One approach might be to make the reference class as narrow and specific as
possible, thereby restricting the question of what might happen in the ordinary course of
things to cases with essentially all the same features. This approach, however, seems to be
unhelpful in that it simply does not give us enough comparative information, as the
variation between cases will be great enough to restrict the reference class to an extent that
will make it useless. In fact, if the reference class were restricted far enough, the
meaningfulness of the objective contemporaneous standard would dissipate. Rather than
focusing on the minute details of the case, I suggest that the appropriate way to establish
the reference class is with broader criteria, using essential features as the means by which
to include similar cases. So, in the above three cases, it might be appropriate to separate
Schroeder and Haynes from Bello, as in the former two cases, the defendant faced repeated
threats that were backed by the reputation of the aggressor. It is unrealistic to assume that
we can establish indubitably clear lines for reference classes, but I believe that we are
capable of distinguishing enough relevant similarities between cases to render the concept
a useful tool.
2.2 Types of Threat
We have established that an objective contemporaneous standard for assessing risk
is the best one we have at our disposal. Next, we must determine what the appropriate
inputs are for this method of assessment. In other words, what sort of things should we
consider when determining whether relevant risk exists in a self-defense situation?
Some of the most important indicators of risk, at least for situations of self-defense,
are threats. A threat is something that indicates the possible existence of future harm. 29
28

U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1999).
Within the context of war and international self-defense, Dapo Akande and Thomas Lieflander
define a threat in the following way: “A threat is a situation where a causal chain can lead from the
status quo (no attack) to an undesired future (attack).” See Akande and Lieflander, “Necessity,
Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defense,” American Journal of International
Law 107, no. 3 (2013): 564. At least in the context of domestic self-defense, it might be more
appropriate to think of a threat as an indication of a situation that could lead to the realization of
harm. Ferzan provides a definition to this effect: “[T]hreats are actions that appear to present a risk
of harm.” Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 736. When an aggressor holds a gun to a victim’s
head, that situation itself does not cause the future harm; rather, the situation indicates that the future
29
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Given this definition, threats are closely tied to risk assessments, as threats are the means
by which a potential defender can evaluate the degree of risk he faces. Generally, however,
the only sorts of threat that have consistently been given weight in self-defense cases are
ones that involve immediate physical violence. Examples of such threats might be an
aggressor putting a loaded gun to a victim’s head or an aggressor advancing upon a victim
with an arm poised to strike.
One type of threat (interestingly, the type of which we often think when using the
word “threat” in everyday language) has been almost entirely excluded from self-defense:
verbal threats. 30 This restriction is understandable: we do not want to broaden the type of
threat considered legitimate to the extent that a joking or impulsive utterance of, “I’m going
to kill you!” should justify someone in employing self-defense. Mere utterances, most of
the time, will not be enough to make a potential aggressor liable to defensive harm. 31 In
light of the discussion of risk in which we have been engaged, though, I suggest that it is
appropriate to push back against this restriction as it stands. In doing so, we need to
distinguish between two different types of situations: ones in which a verbal threat is the
only indication of the existence of risk, and ones in which the risk evidenced by a verbal
threat is confirmed by other information.
Consider the cases of Schroeder and Bello. Recall that, in Bello, the facts of the
case report that the reason Bello thought he was in danger was because Smith had verbally
threatened him. In Schroeder, the defendant also faced verbal threats from an aggressor,
Riggs, but this threat was not the only reason Schroeder considered himself to be at
significant risk. Rather, Schroeder had both the evidence of the verbal threats and of the
fact that Riggs had a reputation of abusing fellow inmates the way he was threatening to
abuse Schroeder. Thus, in Schroeder’s case, Riggs’s utterances were confirmed by
excellent evidence that Riggs was not simply making idle verbal threats; in fact, even
without the direct verbal threat, it does not seem completely unreasonable for Schroeder to
have considered himself in danger. So, for Schroeder, verbal threats confirmed what
already would have been likely when evaluated under the contemporaneous objective
standard: similar situations involving the very same aggressor indicated that Schroeder
truly was in danger.
An objection to this approach is that it seems unfair to the aggressor: should a
person really be liable to defensive harm even without engaging directly in physically
harm is likely by conveying the intentions of the aggressor and providing the means by which the
aggressor can act on those intentions.
30
For a court decision reflecting this view, see People v. Lucas: “[T]hreats alone, unaccompanied
by some act which induces in defendant a reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted,
do not justify a homicide.” People v. Lucas, 160 Ca. App. 2d 305, 310 (1958). It is safe to assume
that the wording of the opinion in this case meant “verbal threats” when referring to “threats.”
31
Liability is a complicated topic that has attracted tremendous scholarly attention in recent years.
Two primary accounts of liability frame the debate: internalism, on which a person is liable to
defensive harm only if such harm is necessary; and externalism, on which a person can be liable to
defensive harm even if such harm is not necessary. I believe that externalism is a better approach.
For a defense of a version of externalism, see Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014): 88-120. Rather than focusing on the internalism/externalism debate,
though, my question deals with what sorts of things can make someone liable to defensive harm.
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abusive action? I suggest that the right answer to this question is “yes.” At least in the
sorts of situations we are discussing, it seems undeniable that most aggressors are aware
that their verbal threats will place their victims in a difficult situation; in fact, this is
probably exactly why they choose to make the verbal threats. So, liability is still being
assigned based on the choice of the aggressor to initiate a game of risk. 32 If anything, it
seems unjust to the potential victim to force him to assume that the aggressor might not
have meant what he said.
This distinction between a threat that consists only of words and a verbal threat
that is confirmed by other evidence gives us a tool with which to allow consideration of
verbal threats while at the same time preserving reasonable restrictions on the type of threat
that legitimizes self-defense. The existence of verbal threats creates risk, and this risk is
often not negligible. Considering some verbal threats in addition to physical threats allows
us to treat risk assessment with a greater level of seriousness and concern.
2.3 Availability of Alternatives
Another concern that often arises in self-defense situations is whether the defender
had other alternatives to employ besides violent self-defense. If a person can choose a
course of action that can dispel the risk he faces and does not involve harming somebody
else, that person should act in the non-harmful manner, even if the person against whom
he is defending himself is fully culpable and liable to defensive harm. 33 One of the ways
this idea has been most clearly articulated is in the duty to retreat that is often demanded
of potential self-defenders. 34 I agree that, if safe retreat is an option, that option should be
the most preferable one for the potential defender to use; however, in some situations
retreat is not an option, and one of the reasons I have been considering prison violence
cases is for that very reason. So, the question becomes whether a person must seek
alternative methods of averting the threat and dispelling the risk even when retreat is not
an option.
32

Ferzan emphasizes the importance of the choice of the aggressor when defining what she thinks
are appropriate “triggering conditions” for the use of self-defense: “Now, it is true that we are
allowing preemptive action based on prediction, but we are also allowing preemptive action based
on the aggressor’s prior choice. The aggressor controls whether she will decide to injure another
person and she controls whether she will act on that intention. At that point, the game is on. It is a
game of risk, and a game of prediction. But the person who culpably initiates the situation can
hardly be heard to complain that the other actor takes her at her word.” Ferzan, “Justifying SelfDefense,” 731.
33
There are ways to affirm the wrongness of inflicting harm on an aggressor even if that aggressor
is culpable and liable. See Frowe, Defensive Killing, 89.
34
The duty to retreat entails that if a person has a way to retreat from the violent situation in safety,
he has an obligation to do so rather than use self-defense. The Model Penal Code reflects this
requirement, stating that an actor may not justifiably use deadly force if he “knows that he can avoid
the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating.” MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(ii).
The duty to retreat has been questioned on several different levels: exceptions include the so-called
“castle doctrine” and “stand your ground” legislation. For a recent argument in defense of the “stand
your ground” approach, see Heidi Hurd, “Stand Your Ground,” in The Ethics of Self-Defense, ed.
Christian Coons and Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 254-273.
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In the prison violence cases under discussion, all three of the defendants were
convicted. Two of them were condemned on the grounds that they did not seek assistance
in their respective situations. 35 Theoretically, there was an alternative way for each of them
to dispel the risk they faced rather than preemptively taking action and attacking their
aggressors: each could have sought help, reported the abuse, or simply waited things out. 36
Theoretically, there was an alternative, but consideration of the reality brings risk into play
again. In many situations involving prison violence, inmates are reluctant to report abuse
for several reasons, including fear of retaliation from the aggressor, being labeled a “snitch”
by fellow inmates, which would very likely lead to a higher level of abuse, or the belief
(and very likely a justified one) that no help would be given even if requested. 37 Thus,
even though these are alternatives to self-defense, they are not alternatives that
unquestionably serve to avert the threat or dispel the risk—in fact, it is arguable that
reporting abuse could actually increase the level of risk a person faces. We do not demand
fulfillment of the duty to retreat unless the person can do so in safety. Why, then, do we
always require the pursuit of alternatives to self-defense when doing so sometimes carries
with it a risk of decreasing rather than increasing safety?
I suggest that requiring a person to take on additional risk as an alternative to
employing self-defense is unjust. The person who should bear additional risk in a violent
situation is not the victim of the situation, but rather the person who culpably creates the
situation. 38 When possible, risk should be transferred to the person responsible for the
creation of that risk. If safe alternatives exist, the potential defender should pursue those
alternatives, but if those alternatives themselves are risky, he should not be required to do
so.

35
In Bello, the opinion stated, “Bello could have reported the incident to the guards and requested
the protection they were required to provide.” See U.S. v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1999).
This reasoning was based off of the court’s decision in U.S. v. Haynes, in which the opinion claimed
that “absence of lawful alternatives is an element of all lesser-evil defenses, of which self-defense
is one.” See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1091 (7th Cir. 1998). Interestingly, though, in the case
of U.S. v. Biggs, the circuit court ruled as follows, in opposition to the decisions in Bello and Haynes:
“Evidence that a defendant had no reasonable opportunity to avoid the use of force is relevant only
to a defense of justification, whether labeled duress, coercion or necessity, and is not an element of
a claim of self-defense.” See U.S. v. Biggs, 441 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). This opinion
demonstrates that there is some hesitancy regarding the requirement that all available alternative
must be exhausted before self-defense becomes a legitimate option.
36
Some scholars suggest that the “wait and see” course of action is the appropriate one, because
something might change that would render the use of self-defensive force superfluous. See
Bakircioglu, “The Contours of the Right to Self-Defense,” 161. I think this approach places an
unjust burden on the potential victim.
37
For example, in Haynes, the aggressor had slammed the defendant down to the floor in front of a
prison guard, and the guard had ignored the violence. See U.S. v. Haynes, 143 F.3d 1089, 1090 (7th
Cir. 1998). In Schroeder, the defendant had requested that Riggs be moved to a different cell several
days before, but no action was taken. See State v. Schroeder, 199 Neb. 822, 824 (1978).
38
Richard Rosen also argues for this claim in “On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill
Their Batterers,” North Carolina Law Review 71, no. 2 (1993): 390-411.
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3. Implications for Self-Defense Doctrine
Throughout this paper, I have tried to avoid appealing to discussions about two of
the central elements of the traditional (and still widely accepted) doctrine of self-defense:
imminence and necessity. 39 I deliberately avoided invoking these two features of the selfdefense doctrine, as doing so would have brought the argument to an abrupt halt. Starting
with imminence and necessity severely limits the range of discussion possible. Yet, the
latter two issues considered above—types of threats and availability of alternatives—are
grounded in concerns about these two main features of most self-defense doctrines. 40 Now
that I have established methods for thinking about types of threats and availability of
alternatives in light of risk assessments, we are in a position to confront the requirements
of imminence and necessity, examining what the implications for these two features of selfdefense might be given the conclusions reached above.
First, consider imminence. When we take risk assessments into account, it is clear
that substantial risk can exist even when the danger to the potential victim is not imminent.
Why, then, should we refuse to include these assessments of risk in our evaluation of the
legitimacy of self-defense? Defenders of imminence might answer that the imminence
requirement serves two purposes with respect to risk: to help provide a truly accurate
assessment of risk, and to help ensure that the level of risk is high enough to merit selfdefensive action. 41 I will consider the former response first. True, in most situations, it
will be easier to assess risk with confidence that our assessment is accurate when
imminence is present; after all, the shorter the time frame between the birth of the threat
and the expected manifestation of that threat, the less we have to worry about factors that
might intervene during that time frame. I think this point would not be easy to dispute, and
I will not attempt to do so; however, this, in itself, provides little reason to reject other
valuable methods of risk assessment. The contemporaneous objective standard explored
above, in many situations, could yield an accurate assessment of risk even when the
threatened harm is in the future.
Turn next to the latter objection on the part of the imminence defender: imminence
helps ensure that a very high level of risk is present. The problem with this response is
39

As an example, here is Illinois’s statute: “A person is justified in the use of force against another
when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself
or another against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/7-1
(West 2014).
40
The imminence requirement has been under fire in recent years. For example, see Rosen, “On
Self-Defense,” 371-411. Reflecting these concerns, some jurisdictions have done away with the
imminence requirement. For example, see Texas’s self-defense statute: “[A] person is justified in
using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful
force.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 9.31 (West 2007).
41
Anthony Sebok suggests the belief that the level of risk cannot be high enough without physical
confrontation is what motivated the decision in Schroeder: “[Judges] ultimately do not believe the
probability of the infliction of a φ is ever as high in a nonconfrontational circumstance as it is in a
confrontation.” Anthony Sebok, “Does an Objective Theory of Self-Defense Demand Too Much?”
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 57 (1996): 741.
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twofold. First, given our discussion of risk, it seems we can reasonably claim that a very
high level of risk is present in a situation even when imminence is absent. Second, this
objection seems to be assuming that only an extremely high level of risk—one approaching
a certainty of harm—is sufficient to merit self-defensive action. Imminence gives the
benefit of the doubt to the aggressor rather than the defender, thereby shifting the burden
of risk further into the defender’s court. 42 But, given the above conclusion that the burden
of risk should be shifted to the person responsible for the creation of the risk, this approach
seems faulty. As a result, imminence is a questionable requirement to put on the use of
self-defense.
Many scholars have suggested that the real reason imminence is generally
considered to be important is because it shows us when self-defense is truly necessary. 43
This point brings us to another foundational element of self-defense doctrine. The
necessity prong of traditional self-defense doctrine says that a person may act in selfdefense only when defensive action is necessary to avert the harm in question.44 Now, as
noted above, necessity is never absolute, because our limited epistemic position makes it
impossible for us ever to be completely sure that defensive force is the only way a threat
can be averted. Nevertheless, we strive to as close an approximation of necessity as
possible, and it continues to serve as the measuring stick by which we evaluate claims to
self-defense. 45 Despite recognition of the fact that necessity cannot, practically, be
absolute, I suggest self-defense doctrine has still failed to appreciate fully the difficulties
posed by our limited epistemic status at the expense of many potential victims in
threatening situations.
In most of the prison violence cases we have been considering, it would be a stretch
to say that the use of self-defensive force was truly necessary. The exception to this
statement might be Schroeder: since the defendant had already sought help, to no avail,
42
This reading is how Ferzan interprets the role of the imminence requirement: “Importantly, the
imminence requirement, or absence thereof, shifts the risk of harm between the aggressor and the
defender.” Ferzan, “Justifying Self-Defense,” 719.
43
This is a very common view of the role of imminence in the self-defense doctrine; scholars often
refer to imminence as a “proxy” for necessity. See Richard Rosen, “On Self-Defense,” 380. Ferzan,
however, defends the imminence requirement with different reasoning, claiming that getting rid of
imminence leads to a failure to separate acts of self-defense from acts of mere self-preference and
that imminence is not merely a proxy for necessity but serves an independent purpose—to determine
when aggression is actually present. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, “Defending Imminence: From
Battered Women to Iraq.” Arizona Law Review 46 (2004): 213-262. Ferzan’s account of
aggression seems to indicate that only physical attack can function as aggression, but I think verbal
threats, at least when backed by known reputation, should count as aggressive action as well.
44
Or when a person “reasonably believes” the action is necessary. As we are trying to work within
an objective framework, I will simply deal with an objective necessity requirement here.
45
For example, Stephen Morse suggests using an extremely close approximation to necessity: “If
death or serious bodily harm in the relatively near future is a virtual certainty and the future attack
cannot be adequately defended against when it is imminent and if there really are no reasonable
alternatives, traditional self-defense doctrine ought to justify the pre-emptive strike.” See Stephen
Morse, “‘New Syndrome Excuse’ Syndrome,” Criminal Justice Ethics 14 (1995): 12. I believe,
however, this level of “virtual certainty” is still unrealistic and is therefore unjust to the potential
victim.
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we might be comfortable with asserting that Schroeder had no other option open to him
and that the risk was high enough (in that it was a close enough approximation to necessity)
to legitimize self-defense when the necessity requirement is in place. In the other cases,
however, the defendants could have sought help, reported the threats, or simply waited
things out to see what would happen. But, as discussed above, requiring the defendants to
follow any of these other paths arguably would have exposed them to an even higher level
of risk than they already were facing. If we want to maintain that it is unjust to force a
person who is already a victim to take on additional risk in order to protect the person
responsible for imposing risk, then we must say that such persons should not be forced to
absorb any additional risk when doing so could be avoided. And, if the only way to avoid
absorbing additional risk is to transfer that risk to the aggressor, then we must say that the
victim should transfer the risk to the aggressor. And if the only way to transfer the risk to
the aggressor is to act in preemptive self-defense, then the victim should be able to act in
preemptive self-defense, even if such self-defense is not clearly necessary.
This train of reasoning makes it clear that my analysis of risk assessment carries
with it a major implication for self-defense doctrine: it seems there are some situations in
which a person should be able to act in self-defense even if we conclude self-defensive
action did not really seem necessary. In the prison violence cases described above, we
cannot be sure that self-defensive action was necessary, but our level of confidence is even
less when we consider whether the potential victim could have pursued an alternative
course of action without thereby incurring a greater level of risk. This undermining of
necessity is a serious consequence, and it might be that it is a cost too great to justify using
risk assessments in the way I have suggested. Addressing this difficulty, however, is
beyond the scope of this project, so I will consider it sufficient to point out the problem
and leave the weighing of the costs and benefits for another time. From this discussion,
however, it is clear that taking risk seriously in self-defensive situations has deep
consequences for self-defense doctrine as it is currently written and generally accepted.
4. Conclusion
Let us return to the pair of cases that motivated this exploration of the concept of
risk. Recall that in Case 1, Dr. Maleficus was playing Russian roulette with Bill, holding
a gun with one thousand chambers to Bill’s head. In Case 2, the Dread Pirate Roberts had
threatened to kill Westley in the morning, but during the night Westley had a chance to kill
the Dread Pirate Roberts first. Current self-defense doctrine would be able to absolve Bill
but not Westley, and I suggested this outcome seems wrong.
Given my argument regarding the proper application of risk analysis to cases of
self-defense, we now have the tools to make a case for the claim that Westley should also
be able to act in self-defense. Westley faces risk of death, and as judged by a
contemporaneous objective standard, that risk is significant. The threats of the Dread Pirate
Roberts have been given in verbal form, and as of yet, he has not physically threatened
Westley; however, those verbal threats contain a high level of credibility given the other
evidence Westley has about the merciless history of the pirate. Westley, arguably, has
some alternatives he could pursue rather than acting in self-defense: he could simply wait
things out, he could try to escape on a lifeboat, or he could hide someplace on the ship and
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hope he is not discovered before the ship reaches the next port. But, even if any of these
alternatives have a chance of success, they all require Westley to absorb additional risk.
Given these considerations, it seems that the level of risk Westley faces is sufficient to
merit him acting in self-defense, despite the facts that the threat he faces is not imminent
and that it is not clear that acting in self-defense is truly necessary. Thus, if Bill is justified
in killing Dr. Maleficus, despite the low level of risk Bill faces, Westley should be able to
kill the Dread Pirate Roberts in self-defense.
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